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COMMENTS
UNITED STATES v. PROGRESSIVE, INC.. THE NATIONAL
SECURITY AND FREE SPEECH CONFLICT
The first amendment of the Constitution grants a broad guaran-
tee of freedom to the press.1 This freedom, however, is not abso-
lute.2 One limitation on the first amendment involves the protec-
tion of national security; a publication that endangers the safety of
the United States may be proscribed.' The United States District
Court for the Western District of Wisconsin confronted these con-
flicting interests of national security and freedom of the press in
United States v. Progresswe, Inc.
4
In Progressive, Judge Warren granted a preliminary injunction
that prevented The Progressive magazine from publishing an arti-
cle on thermonuclear weaponry until specified portions were de-
leted.5 The disputed sections contained technical information
about the construction of nuclear weapons that the government
claimed would endanger the national security by assistmg other
nations to produce thermonuclear weapons.' In granting the in-
junction, the district court was the first to authorize a prior re-
straint on the press based on national security interests.
This Comment will explore the history of litigation in the field of
prior restraints on the press and will explain how Judge Warren's
decision departed from precedent. Based on this review of prior
case law, the Comment concludes that the court misapplied both
1. "Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 708, 716 (1931); Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357, 371-73 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,
627-28 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
3. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (citing Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47, 52 (1918)).
4. 467 F Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis.), dismissed, No. 79-1428 (7th Cir. Oct. 1, 1979).
5. Id. at 997.
6. Id. at 995.
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the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,1 under which the government pro-
ceeded, and the standards that govern injunctive relief in first
amendment cases. Through its errors, the court severely dimin-
ished the scope and force of the first amendment guarantee of free-
dom of the press.
UNITED STATES V PROGRESSIVE, INC.
In Progresswe, the government sought to restrain publication of
a magazine article on nuclear weapons written by Robert Morland.
The Progressive magazine assigned Morland to research and write
an article about the hydrogen bomb.8 Morland then assimilated in-
formation gathered from the public domain9 into the contested
concepts, obtaining some information independently and other
data from government officials. The magazine's managing editor
submitted a copy of Morland's article, entitled "The H-Bomb Se-
cret - How We Got It, Why We're Telling It," to the Department
of Energy, requesting verification of its technical accuracy After
reviewing the article, the Department of Energy determined that it
contained restricted data, publication of which would constitute a
violation of the Atomic Energy Act. When the magazine an-
nounced that it intended to publish the full article, the govern-
ment sought a restraining order. In the action to enjoin publication
of the article in its original form, the government relied on the
Atomic Energy Act, which permits restraining orders when the De-
partment of Energy decides that important secrets will be re-
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
8. 467 F Supp. at 998.
9. Id. at 991. The government argued that although the information was in the public
domain, it could impress classification on such information if, "when drawn together, syn-
thesized and collated, such information acquire[d] the character of presenting immediate,
direct and irreparable harm to the interests of the United States." Id. In accepting this
argument, the court determined that the public nature of the information was irrelevant
when the publication "would surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable harm." Id.
at 996.
That material may be "classified at birth" has been accepted by other courts. In Alfred A.
Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975), the Fourth
Circuit concluded that the appropriate inquiry in determining what information is in the
public domain is whether the information is "so generally believed to be true" that publica-
tion would have no impact. Id. at 1370-71. See also Aspin v. Department of Defense, 453 F
Supp. 520 (E.D. Wis. 1978);'Halperin v. CIA, 446 F Supp. 661 (D.D.C. 1978).
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vealed. 10 In response, the magazine asserted that an injunction
would contravene fundamental first amendment principles. 1
The opinion balanced the conflicting claims of national security
and freedom of the press by relying primarily on Near v. Minne-
sota, 1 2 in which the Supreme Court first mentioned the national
security exception to first amendment protection, and by distm-
guishing New York Times v. United States,"3 in which the Court
declined to apply this exception. Judge Warren reasoned that if
the article served to accelerate, even slightly, the rate at which an-
other country might develop nuclear weaponry, then such aid
could be disastrous because of the deadly nature of such weapons.
His decision rested on the assumption that the addition of nations
to the nuclear community would increase the likelihood of a nu-
clear holocaust. 4 He noted that if the right to live were balanced
against freedom of the press, the first amendment would fade m
importance because without life, the issue of self-expression neces-
sarily would be moot.' 5 Moreover, the court discerned no reason
why technical aspects of hydrogen bomb construction would be es-
sential to the first amendment object of preserving the public's
right to engage in informed discussion.'" Evaluation of the cogency
of Judge Warren's analysis requires an understanding of the effect
of the first amendment on prior restraints of publication and a de-
termination of the effect, if any, of congressional authorization on
the validity of these restraints.
PRIOR RESTRAINTS
The first amendment and judicial interpretation of its provisions
rest philosophically on the concept that a free exchange of ideas is
essential to the discovery of truth and the maintenance of a politi-
cal democracy.1 7 A prior restraint by definition inhibits this ex-
10. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
11. 467 F Supp. at 991.
12. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
13. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
14. 467 F Supp. at 996.
15. Id. at 995-96.
16. Id. at 994.
17. The courts have subscribed to the view that truth emerges from open debate. See,
e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Abrams v.
1980]
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change of ideas because it withholds from the public the oppor-
tunity to appraise the content and merit of a concept. Such
censorship is subject to the abuses of arbitrariness and discrimma-
tion imposed by those who administer it."5 If prior restraints were
permitted, then a publisher no longer would have the option of air-
mg his ideas and subsequently submitting to statutory punish-
ment. For these reasons, courts burden prior restraints with a
heavy presumption of invalidity 19
Historically, prior restraints exercised through licensing systems
have proved extremely effective in controlling the press. Prior re-
straints thus have been favored by those who wish to control pub-
lic opinion," and opposed by authorities such as Blackstone, who
believed freedom from prior restraints is the essence of a free
press.2 ' Blackstone's view prevailed in the United States and the
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Alexander Meiklejohn is
the chief proponent of the theory that the major function of the freedom of speech is the
facilitation of open political discourse within a democratic society. See generally A.
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1st ed. 1948).
18. Thomas Emerson, a first amendment scholar, wrote that a system of prior restraint
is likely to bring under government scrutiny a far wider range of expression; it
shuts off communication before it takes place; suppression by a stroke of the
pen is more likely to be applied than suppression through a criminal process;
the procedures do not require attention to the safeguards of the criminal pro-
cess; the system allows less opportunity for public appraisal and criticism; the
dynamics of the system drive toward excesses, as the history of all censorship
shows.
T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 506 (1970). See also Emerson, The
Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 648, 658 (1955); Litwack, The Doc-
tnne of Prior Restraint, 12 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 519 (1977).
John Milton viewed the system with suspicion because of the kind of man who fills the
role of censor. Milton wrote,
[T]here cannot be a more tedious and unpleasing journeywork, a greater loss of
time levied upon his head, than to be made perpetual reader of unchosen
books and pamphlets [W]e may easily foresee what kind of licensers we
are to expect hereafter, either ignorant, imperious, and remiss, or basely
pecuniary.
J. MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 20-21 (Everyman ed. 1927).
19. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971); Bantam
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
20. Such authority has been wielded both by religious and secular authorities. For exam-
ple, in 1501, Pope Alexander VI issued a papal bull prohibiting unlicensed printing. 4 W
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 360-79 (2d ed. 1937). Similar control and censor-
ship were exercised by Parliament through the Licensing Act, 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 33 (1662).
See Emerson, supra note 18, at 650.
21. The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but this
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elimination of prior restraints was a primary target of the first
amendment.
Prior restraints on the press so seldom are requested or granted
that little case law exists on the subject. The significant cases that
discuss the issue are Near v. Minnesota2 2 and New York Times v.
United States.23 In neither decision was the prior restraint upheld.
In Near, however, the Supreme Court stated that the prior re-
straints might be valid in cases of national emergency 24 The Court
expanded this position in Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago25 by
refusing to invalidate on its face a law that required that all movies
be reviewed by a film board before screening. The decision indi-
cated that a prior restraint is not invalid per se, but must be
judged on its merits with careful scrutiny of the factual
circumstances. 26
In Progresswe, the government relied on the national security
exception enunciated in Near 27 In Near, the State of Minnesota
attempted to exercise a prior restraint on the press through a stat-
ute that provided that a publisher of a defamatory newspaper or
magazine was guilty of a nuisance and could be enjoined from fu-
ture violations.2" Despite the scurrilous nature of the newspaper
consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom
from censure for criminal matter when published. Every freeman has an un-
doubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid
this is to destroy the freedom of the press.
4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151-52 (emphasis original). For examples of decisions
adopting Blackstone's view, see Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697; 713 (1931) and Patterson
v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
22. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
23. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
24. 283 U.S. at 716.
25. 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
26. Id. at 49-50.
27. 467 F Supp. at 996.
28. Any person who, as an individual, or as a member or employee of a firm, or
association or organization, or as an officer, director, member or employee of a
corporation, shall be engaged in the business of regularly or customarily pro-
ducing, publishing or circulating, having in possession, selling or giving away.
(a) an obscene, lewd and lascivious newspaper, magazine, or other peri-
odical, or
(b) a malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or
other periodical,
is guilty of a nuisance, and all persons guilty of such nuisance may be enjoined,
as hereinafter provided.
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involved,29 the Supreme Court held that the law was unconstitu-
tional because it suppressed and censored the publisher, thus con-
travening the intent of the drafters of the Bill of Rights.3 0 The
Court noted that such restraints are invalid except in severely lim-
ited circumstances, such as times of war. Even during war, how-
ever, the permissible restraints were narrow: "[A] government
might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the
publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and
location of troops. ' ' 1
The Court in Near cited Schenck v. United States 2 as authority
for this position. The defendants in Schenck had distributed anti-
war, socialist propaganda during World War I and were prosecuted
under the Espionage Act of 1917 -3 The Court upheld the convic-
tion of the propagandists, saying, "When a nation is at war many
things that might .be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to
its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men
fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any
constitutional right. 3 4 The Court's reference to Schenck indicated
that the exception to the rule against prior restraints was associ-
ated specifically with wartime. This strict standard of review for
prior restraints has operated from 1931 when Near was decided
until the present day
Although Judge Warren relied heavily on Near, Progresswe is
distinguishable from Near and Schenck in several respects. These
earlier cases referred to national security during wartime. Progres-
sive, however, must be viewed within a peacetime context even
though, as Judge Warren noted, the nature of nuclear weapons
makes war an imminent possibility.3 5 Notwithstanding this omni-
present danger, to judge all speech for the duration of the nuclear
1925 Minn. Laws ch. 285, quoted in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 702 (1931).
29. The dissenting opinion quoted the following excerpt from the newspaper as typical:
"Practically every vendor of vile hooch, every owner of a moonshine still, every snake-faced
gangster and embryonic yegg in the Twin Cities is a JEW" 283 U.S. at 724 n.1 (Butler, J.,
dissenting).
30. Id. at 722-23.
31. Id. at 716 (citing Z. CHAFEE, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 10).
32. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
33. Pub. L. No. 24, § 3, 40 Stat. 217 (1917) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 794 (1970)).
34. 249 U.S. at 52.
35. 467 F Supp. at 996.
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age by a wartime standard would inhibit materially the right of
expression.
In Schenck, Justice Holmes enunciated a test for identifying
words that could be prosecuted over first amendment objections.
The words must constitute a "clear and present danger" of evils
that Congress has the right to prohibit.36 Like the publication in
Near, the magazine article in Progresswe fulfilled neither element
of this test. Two camps of eminent scientists disagreed on whether
the information would harm the United States;37 the danger thus
was far from clear. Even if a danger did exist, it was not a present
danger. Judge Warren agreed that the information in the Morland
article only could have advanced the future date at which a coun-
try would be able to explode a thermonuclear device.3 8 For these
reasons, this case fell outside the narrow limits delineated by the
Court in Near as they were formulated in Schenck.
Examples of governmental attempts to impose prior restraints
on the press for national security reasons seldom arise; the last
such case was New York Times v. United States.9 The New York
Times and Washington Post were preparing to publish documents
entitled "History of U.S. Decision-Making Process on Vietnam
Policy," otherwise known as the Pentagon Papers.4 0 The docu-
ments contained a comprehensive, top secret review of American
involvement in Indochina, which was commissioned by Robert
McNamara in 1967 and included details of covert operations, se-
cret decisions, and all phases of executive policy making. The gov-
ernment attempted to suppress publication of the documents on
the basis of national security, asserting that the case fell within the
rule of Near and Schenck. Rejecting the government's claim, the
Supreme Court issued a per curiam opinion based on a vote of six
to three, that stated only that the government had failed to meet
the heavy burden against the validity of a prior restraint.41
36. 249 U.S. at 52. In Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), Justice Holmes refor-
mulated the test in Near as a requirement of "a present danger of immediate evil." Id. at
628 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
37. Affidavit of Sewell at -, Affidavit of Pickering at -, Affidavit of Van Doren at
38. 467 F Supp. at 994.
39. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
40. THE NEW YORK TIMES, THE PENTAGON PAPE S (1971).
41. 403 U.S. at 714. The three dissenting Justices, Burger, Harlan and Blackmun, were
1980]
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In Progressive, Judge Warren distinguished New York Times on
three grounds. In New York Times, the government had shown no
cogent reason why the release of the information would injure the
United States; in Progresswe, however, the government provided
convincing reasons. In addition, the information in the Pentagon
Papers was historical, whereas the Morland article reported techni-
cal data. Finally, in New York Times the government based its
case solely on executive privilege; in Progresswe, the government
acted under the auspices of a specific statute.42
Judge Warren's first distinction, based on the "cogent reasons"
presented in Progressive, merits criticism. In New York Times,
Justice White voted for disclosure even though he believed publi-
cation would do serious damage to the United States.43 Justice
Douglas also noted in his opinion that the documents might well
have a serious impact on the country,44 and Justice Stewart dis-
cussed his fear that the loss of credibility occasioned by publica-
tion of the Pentagon Papers would damage the ability of the Presi-
dent to conduct foreign affairs.45 These Justices recognized the
potentially serious consequences of publication of the material, in-
dicating that the government in that case likewise offered cogent
reasons why publication should not occur. Judge Warren's distinc-
tion between the two cases on this basis thus was invalid. Cogent
reasons not to publish alone do not constitute a sufficient basis for
issuance of an injunction.
Judge Warren also stated that the technical information in-
cluded in the magazine's proposed article was more damaging than
the historical information in the Pentagon Papers, which con-
cerned events that had occurred between three and twenty years
opposed more to the Court's procedure than to its opinion on the merits. Each believed the
Court had rushed its decision without due care and investigation. Chief Justice Burger said
he had no time to review the case in detail and felt that the Court should have considered
the illegal methods by which the documents were obtained. Id. at 750-52 (Burger, C.J., dis-
senting). Justice Harlan characterized the Court's action as "irresponsibly feverish." Id. at
753 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun said that, because of extreme haste, the
Court's decision had "much writing about the law and little knowledge and less digestion of
the facts." Id. at 760 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
42. 467 F Supp. at 994.
43. 403 U.S. at 731 (White, J., concurring).
44. Id. at 722-23 (Douglas, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 729-30 (Stewart, J., concurring).
[Vol. 22:141
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before the publication controversy arose.46 This second distinction
is invalid for two reasons. First, the disclosure of historical data
can be extremely damaging, as recognized in New York Times.47
Second, the historical nature of the data was not mentioned at any
length in the several opinions in New York Times, indicating that
the Justices considered this irrelevant to the decison.
CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION
Distinguishing New York Times and Progresswe on the basis
that the latter involved a statute presents a more complicated is-
sue. Some of the Justices in New York Times discussed the hypo-
thetical effect of a statute on the case although none existed. Ac-
cording to Justices Black and Douglas, congressional authorization
could not legitimize any prior restraint because the first amend-
ment states that Congress can make "no law" abridging freedom of
the press.48 Justice Stewart recognized that if Congress passed a
specific law authorizing injunctive proceedings, the Court would
have to decide both its applicability and its constitutionality. 49 An
injunction authorized by Congress may be unconstitutional be-
cause, in the words of James Madison, the Bill of Rights was
designed to be "an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption
of power in the Legislative or Executive; they will be naturally led
to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for
in the Constitution by-the declaration of rights."50
The statute cited in Progresswe as congressional authorization
for an injunction was the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.51 Reliance on
this statute, however, was misplaced. First, the Act was inapplica-
ble to the facts presented. Second, the Act itself is unconstitution-
ally vague and overbroad.52
46. 467 F Supp. at 994.
47. See notes 39-41 supra & accompanying text.
48. 403 U.S. at 716-17 (Black, J., concurring); id. at 720 (Douglas, J., concurring).
49. Id. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring).
50. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 439 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1789).
51. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
52. "Void for vagueness" is defined as the condition where the statute contains "words
and phrases so vague and indefinite that any penalty prescribed for their violation con-
stitutes a denial of due process of law." Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Coim'n, 286 U.S.
210, 243 (1932). This test is particularly applicable to the facts of this case because "the
standard of definiteness for statutes curtailing free expression is stricter than it is for other
1980]
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The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 revised the Atomic Energy Act
of 1946.53 One of the major purposes of the 1954 amendments, as
enunciated by President Eisenhower when he proposed the legisla-
tion, was to increase dissemination of information about the
atomic bomb to allies. By 1954 the United States no longer had a
monopoly on nuclear power; the President thus desired legislation
to "make it possible for us to exchange information with our mili-
tary allies and also to cooperate more closely with friendly
nations.
54
Although Congress retained strict controls on Restricted Data in
section 2274, Representative Van Zandt characterized the House
bill as "an unequivocal directive to the [Atomic Energy] Commis-
sion to maintain continuous review of all classified information and
to declassify and publish all scientific and technical data which can
be published without undue risk to the common defense and secur-
ity " 5 5 The authors of the statute thus actually intended to maxi-
mize dissemination of information to the public.
Congress believed that classifying only information with poten-
tially devastating impact would promote greater overall security
and protection of atomic secrets.58 The smaller the bulk of material
to be safeguarded, the less supervision required. Moreover, if peo-
ple were aware that only essential documents are classified, they
would respect the system more than if they believed that much
classified information was harmless. Possibly, the legislators also
sought to restrict the quantity of secret information to curb the
types of statutes." Scott, Constitutional Limitations on Substantive Criminal Law, 29
ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 275, 288 (1957) (citing Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948)).
53. Pub. L. No. 585, 60 Stat. 755 (1946) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1970
& Supp. V 1975)).
54. 100 CONG. REc. 11655 (1954). The American monopoly in nuclear weaponry ended m
the summer of 1949 with the Soviet Union's detonation of an atomic bomb. See, e.g., T.
BAILEY, A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 789 (8th ed. 1969).
55. 100 CONG. REc. at 11672. Representative Van Zandt stated that the bill improved "the
policy declarations with respect to the Commission's obligations to control of [sic] informa-
tion in such manner as to assure the common defense and security and to expand and
enlarge the Nation's reservoir of scientific knowledge available to all our teachers and re-
search workers." Id.
56. "The joint committee has long been of the opinion that the most effective security is
attained only if the areas of information requiring protection are held down to include only
that information which positively needs protection." Id. The word "positively" indicates
that Congress intended to exclude information that would yield only speculative risk.
[Vol. 22:141
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tendency of the executive branch toward excessive secrecy.57
In Progresswe, the government requested the injunction on the
basis of sections 2274(b), 2014(y), and 2280 of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954.58 Section 2280 of the Act authorizes the government to
seek an injunction if an individual is about to violate a preceding
57. In Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (per curiam), a case involving the
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976 & Supp. II 1978), the court observed this
tendency, saying "Government officials who would not stoop to misrepresentation may re-
flect an inherent tendency to resist disclosure, and judges may take this natural inclination
into account." 587 F.2d at 1195. Other commentators also have noted this tendency toward
secrecy. See, e.g., Cleveland & Braun, The Limits of Obsession: Fencing in the "National
Security" Claim, 28 AD. L. REv. 327, 333 (1976).
58. The term "Restricted Data" means all data concerning (1) design, manufacture,
or utilization of atomic weapons; (2) the production of special nuclear material;
or (3) the use of special nuclear material in the production of energy, but shall
not include data declassified or removed from the Restricted Data category
pursuant to section 2162 of this title.
42 U.S.C. § 2014(y) (1970).
Communication of Restricted Data
Whoever, lawfully or unlawfully, having possession of, access to, control over,
or being entrusted with any document, writing, sketch, photograph, plan,
model, instrument, appliance, note, or information involving or incorporating
Restricted Data -
(a) communicates, transmits, or discloses the same to any individual or
person, or attempts or conspires to do any of the foregoing, with intent
to injure the United States or with intent to secure an advantage to any
foreign nation, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprison-
ment for life, or by imprisonment for any term of years or a fine of not
more than $20,000 or both;
(b) communicates, transmits, or discloses the same to any individual or
person, or attempts or conspires to do any of the foregoing, with reason
to believe such data will be utilized to injure the United States or to
secure an advantage to any foreign nation, shall, upon conviction, be
punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not
more than ten years, or both.
42 U.S.C. § 2274 (1970).
Injunction proceedings
Whenever in the judgment of the Commission any person has engaged or is
about to engage m any acts or practices which constitute or will constitute a
violation of any provision of this chapter, or any regulation or order issued
thereunder, the Attorney General on behalf of the United States may make
application to the appropriate court for an order enjoining such acts or prac-
tices, or for an order enforcing compliance with such provision, and upon a
showing by the Commission that such person has engaged or is about to engage
m any such acts or practices, a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining
order, or other order may be granted.
42 U.S.C. § 2280 (1970).
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section of the Act. The government alleged that the author of the
article was about to violate section 2274(b), 59 which prohibits the
dissemination of Restricted Data, as defined in section 2014(y).10
In section 2274(b), the significant phrase is "reason to believe" it
will cause harm. 1 The language requires application of a subjective
standard, demonstrating that the subject must have had reason to
believe that harm would occur, not that he might have believed or
that someone else would have known. The statute leaves no room
for speculation about what the publication might or could do.
The Act adapted an accepted common law aim of safeguarding
the nation's security to the new problems raised by the prolifera-
tion of nuclear weaponry Section 2274(b) requires that the govern-
ment show that the release would cause actual harm, thereby pro-
tecting the publisher from speculative claims. The wording of the
statute resembles that of the Espionage Act of 1919,"2 which for-
bade the dissemination of classified documents that would injure
the United States. This similarity of language indicates that any
constitutional problem with the statute in this case is one of over-
interpretation rather than unconstitutional text. Because the
courts have upheld the Espionage Act,63 they likewise must uphold
the language of the 1954 Act.
Application of the Atomic Energy Act
The first issue raised by the statute is whether the Act is appli-
cable to the facts of Progresswe. Section 2280 authorizes the gov-
ernment to seek an injunction if an individual is about to violate
another part of the statute. 4 In order to violate section 2274(b),
the section in question here, the violator must have reason to be-
lieve that publication will injure the United States.6 5 This section
59. 467 F Supp. at 991, 994.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(y) (1970). For the full text of this section, see note 58 supra.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 2274(b) (1970). See note 58 supra.
62. Pub. L. No. 24, § 3, 40 Stat. 217 (1917) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 794 (1970)).
63. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47 (1919); United States v. Heine, 151 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 833
(1946); Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F 535 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 246
F 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 2280 (1970).
65. Id. § 2274(b) (1970).
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is inapplicable to Morland's actions because the information he
gathered already was in the public domain.68 The government con-
tended that publication of certain pieces of information in the arti-
cle in conjunction with each other was novel; consequently, even
though the information was in the public domain, the synthesis of
thought in the article was new, and therefore classified at its
inception.67
According to United States v. Heine,68 however, information
originating in the public domain cannot be used to prosecute a per-
son under such statutory language. In Heine, a German-born
American citizen sent large quantities of information about the
American aviation industry to Germany during the period immedi-
ately preceding American entry into World War II. Heine obtained
the information from various public sources, including interviews
with people in the aviation industry, but he collated, synthesized,
and condensed the data himself.6" In an opinion written by Judge
Learned Hand, the Second Circuit reversed the conviction ob-
tained against HemeO0 under the Espionage Act of 1917, which
prohibited disclosure of information affecting national defense
"with intent or reason to believe it [was] to be used to the injury of
the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation. 7 1 This
language bears a striking resemblance to section 2274(b) in its re-
quirement of reason to believe that injury will occur.
In Heine, Judge Hand wrote,
"Where there is no occasion for secrecy, there can, of
course, in all likelihood be no reasonable intent to give an ad-
vantage to a foreign government." Obviously, this could not
mean that it may not be to the advantage of a foreign govern-
ment to have possession of such information; it can only mean
that, when the mformation has once been made public, and has
thus become available m one way or another to any foreign gov-
66. 467 F Supp. at 993. The government initially contested this assertion by the defen-
dants. Id. Also, Howard Morland had no security classification, and his correspondence with
government officials showed that he requested unclassified visits. See Letter from James
Cannon to Howard Morland, Exhibit B, Record at
67. 467 F Supp. at 993.
68. 151 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 833 (1946).
69. Id. at 814-15.
70. Id. at 817.
71. Pub. L. No. 24, § 2, 40 Stat. 217 (1917) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 794 (1970)).
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ernment, the "advantage" intended by the section cannot reside
in facilitating its use by condensing and arranging it.72
Heine relates to Progressive in the following way If, as the maga-
zine contends, the information was in the public domain, and this
contention was supported by correspondence showing that Mor-
land had no security clearance,1 then he could not have violated
section 2274(b) and hence no injunctive relief would have been
available under section 2280. The Second Circuit reversed Heine's
conviction even though the defendant had both intent and reason
to believe that the information would help Germany, '74 and he op-
erated during the months when the United States aided the Allies
but had not yet entered the war.75 In contrast, Morland wrote dur-
ing a time of peace and, under the precedent of Heine, had no
demonstrable reason to believe his article would be harmful to the
United States or helpful to a foreign nation. The government ad-
mits in its brief that "if the data in question was already available
in the public domain and well known in the scientific community,
it is difficult to see how the defendant could have reason to believe
that the disclosure would injure the United States. '7 6
Although the government concedes that much, if not all, of the
information was available individually to the average citizen, the
government contends that the disputed article is unique because it
combines the individual concepts synergistically for the first
time.77 One must then weigh a fair reading of the statute and con-
gressional intent to determine whether the law was intended to in-
clude relationships among concepts with which the scientific com-
munity is already familiar. If these relationships were not within
the scope of the legislative intent, then Morland could have had no
reason to believe he was injuring the United States or aiding a for-
eign nation under the requirements of section 2274(b). If he was
not about to violate the statute, then the government cannot en-
force the injunctive provision of section 2280.
72. 151 F.2d at 817 (quoting Gorln v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 28 (1941)).
73. Letter from James Cannon to Howard Morland, Exhibit B, Record at -
74. 151 F.2d at 817.
75. See, e.g., J. BLUM, V WAS FOR VICTORY: POLITICS AND AMERICAN CULTURE DURING
WORLD WAR II 7 (1976).
76. Supplemental Brief of United States, at 11.
77. 467 F Supp. at 993.
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FREE SPEECH
The statute not only must be applicable to the facts, it also must
be constitutional in application. 8 In New York Times, Justice
Brennan said that the government's contentions that the national
interest "could," "might," or "may"79 be prejudiced by the publi-
cation were insufficient because "the First Amendment tolerates
absolutely no prior judicial restraints of the press predicated upon
surmise or conjecture that untoward consequences may result."80
The government's allegations in Progresswe contained the same
qualified words Brennan condemned, using the words "could" and
"might" to describe the potential damage.81 The word "will," as
used in the statute, denotes that the legislators did not intend to
prohibit vague and indefinite possible dangers. The statute itself
therefore is constitutional. The constitutionally definite wording
has been misconstrued by the government in bringing its case, and
by Judge Warren in granting the injunction. If the statute were
intended to restrain publications like Morland's, the terms
"might" and "could" would have been used rather than the defi-
nite "will" that actually appears.
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS
Four major factors should be weighed in any case involving a
preliminary injunction: the plaintiff's likelihood of success on the
merits; the prospect of irreparable harm if the injunction is denied;
the comparative hardship the injunction will impose on each party;
and the impact of relief on the public interest.8 2 When a court con-
siders a request for prior restraint of material ordinarily protected
by the first amendment, these factors are applied strictly and the
party seeking to enjoin publication must meet a heavy burden of
78. "Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial m appearance, yet, if it is
applied with an evil eye and an unequal hand, the denial of equal justice is still
within the prohibition of the Constitution." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74
(1886) (citing Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703 (1885)); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370
(1880); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
79. 403 U.S. at 725-26 (Brennan, J., concurring).
80. Id.
81. See Brief of United States, at 15.
82. See, e.g., Blackwelder Furniture Co. v. Seilig Mfg. Co., 550 F.2d 189, 193 (4th Cir.
1977). See also 7 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 65.04 (2d ed. 1979); 11 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2948, at 430-31 (1971); Leubsdorf, The Stan-
dard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARv. L. REv. 525 (1978).
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proof.
The evidence in Judge Warren's opinion suggests that the gov-
ernment did not meet this heavy burden under the four factors.
First, the government was unlikely to succeed on the merits. As
Judge Warren observed, both sides presented copious evidence
from experts with impressive credentials.83 This conflicting testi-
mony indicates no certainty of a threat to national security suffi-
cient to justify a prior restraint on speech. Moreover, the material
was in the public domain, further weakening the government's
argument.
The government claimed that, without the injunction, irrevoca-
ble damage to our national security would ensue. 4 Although denial
of the preliminary injunction would have mooted the issue and ir-
revocably released the potentially harmful information, if the in-
formation was harmless no damage would have resulted. The gov-
ernment then still could have prosecuted Morland and the
magazine under section 2274(b) of the Atomic Energy Act. Also, as
previously stated, the alleged threat to national security was con-
tested. Indeed, this factor was the central issue of the dispute and
as such was inextricably bound in the merits of the case.
With respect to the comparative hardship to the parties, the de-
lay caused by the injunction would impose economic hardship on
the magazine. The timeliness of articles necessarily is critical to
periodicals to maintain circulation. For example, reader interest in
an issue that discussed the merits of the SALT treaty would fade
once consideration of the treaty ended.
Finally, in cases such as Progresswe, the interests of all members
of the public are affected, not just the interests of those with
standing to litigate.8 5 All Americans have an interest both in na-
tional security and in preservation of a free press. If the danger to
the nation were compelling, then the public interest would favor
suppression of the information. In this case, however, the public
interest in a free press outweighed the speculative danger to the
nation.
83. 467 F Supp. at 992.
84. Id. at 995. The government presented testimony to support its contention from both
the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State. Id.
85. See Leubsdorf, supra note 84, at 550.
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FREE SPEECH
The public interest in a free press is twofold. The information in
this particular article would have an impact upon the "uninhib-
ited, robust, and wide-open" debate" of the issues of nuclear test-
ing and disarmament; the magazine asserted that this article was
vital to such discussion.s In addition, the public has the more gen-
eral interest in a free and open marketplace of ideas. Stifling publi-
cation poses the danger of external and self-censorship in the fu-
ture in contravention of the public interest.
Balancing the above four factors is difficult. Some scholars have
approached the problem quantitatively,88 but for the courtroom
judge lacking familiarity with calculus and the desire to reduce
human events to a purely scientific formula, the issue becomes one
of a common sense balancing of potential injuries to all parties. In
a case with such a lack of consensual agreement regarding the in-
terpretation and applicability of the statute, the danger presented
by the article, and the probability of success on the merits, the
presumption favoring freedom of the press should be determina-
tive and no injunction should issue.
Regardless of whether the preliminary injunction granted to the
government was warranted, the court's decision failed to answer
the ultimate question of whether the article should be published.
The decision only addressed whether the press or the government
has the right to decide. That the press generally has the right to
decide this matter, even in cases involving national security, is well
established. 9 If the material could prove dangerous, the magazine
should exercise its discretion and not use the first amendment as a
tool to gain publicity through sensationalistic journalism. Harm
might result not only from this particular article, but also from a
society that believes the press abuses its freedom and therefore
will be willing to enact more stringent controls against the press in
the future. In addition, the press might lose credibility with the
86. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
87. Brief of Progressive, Inc., at 10.
88. See Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84
HARv. L. REv. 1329 (1971).
89. See Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977); Nebraska Press
Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975);
Bridges v. Califorma, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233
(1936).
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public and thus be unable to perform the watchdog function that
is vital to the maintenance of a democratic society 1o
IMPACT AND PROBLEMS OF PROGRESSIVE
Judge Warren greatly expanded the area in which prior re-
straints are acceptable by eliminating the distinction between war-
time and peacetime restraints. In Abrams v. United States,91 the
Supreme Court upheld the conviction of several men who spoke
against the United States, its efforts in World War I, and its con-
demnation of the Soviet Union. They were convicted under the Es-
pionage Act because their action endangered the United States
during a time of war. The Court explicitly mentioned that such
actions would not be punishable during peacetime.2 Near,
Schenck, and Abrams all considered wartime context as an impor-
tant factor when the government seeks to restrain free expression.
In New York Times, the Court refused to issue an injunction even
during the Vietnam War. In Heine, the Second Circuit overturned
Heine's conviction although the United States already was in-
volved in the European conflict when he aided Germany Judge
Warren eliminated this distinction between peace and war by rea-
soning that, in the nuclear age, war can erupt at a moment's no-
tice.92 If speech formerly punishable only during wartime now is
always punishable, criticism of the government and other sensitive
subjects of debate could be smothered at the whim and discretion
of the administration and the courts. For the indefinite future, the
bounds of free expression could be narrowed to an extent inconsis-
tent with the guarantees of the Bill of Rights.
Judge Warren issued the injunction despite acknowledging that
both sides presented convincing evidence. 4 All of the significant
precedent in this area requires that a heavy presumption operate
against a request for a prior restraint. As a consequence of this
presumption, the government should have borne a burden of proof
90. See generally Hunsaker, Adequate Breathing Space in a Poisonous Atmosphere: Bal-
ancing Freedom and Responsibility in the Open Society, 16 DuQ. L. R.v. 9 (1978).
91. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
92. Id. at 624.
93. 467 F Supp. at 996.
94. Id. at 992.
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substantially heavier than that assigned by the court. In the fu-
ture, if this approach is followed in other jurisdictions, when the
government and the defendant present equal quantities of evi-
dence no weight will be given to first amendment guarantees and
the government will receive the requested injunction.
In his decision, Judge Warren used the very speculative words
condemned by Justice Brennan in his opinion in New York
Times.95 Warren wrote, "[Tlhe article could possibly provide suffi-
cient information to allow a medium sized nation to move faster in
developing a hydrogen weapon. It could provide a ticket to by-pass
blind alleys."98 Judge Warren's decision expanded injunctive relief
into the realm of surmise and conjecture. Henceforth, the govern-
ment need present no concrete evidence of danger; ephemeral fears
will suffice to justify issuance of an injunction. Expansion of prior
restraints into the realms of peace, surmise, and equal evidence
will deprive the public of a substantial quantity of evidence that in
the past it would have received. This deprivation will result both
from the injunctions and from the chilling effect 7 the decision will
have on writers and editors.
CONCLUSION
The importance of both national security and first amendment
freedoms made resolution of the issues in this case difficult. In
light of the speculative nature of the government's case, the first
amendment claim should have outweighed the competing value of
national security and no preliminary injunction should have issued.
Judge Warren's issuance of a preliminary injunction substantially
broadened the availability of prior restraints against publication.
The decision thus provides precedent 8 that threatens the first
95. See notes 78-80 supra & accompanying text.
96. 467 F Supp. at 993.
97. The phrase "chilling effect" first appeared in Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). It is defined as the deterrent effect of an unconstitu-
tional law or decision on protected activity. See Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional
Law, 69 COLUM. L. Rav. 808, 816 (1969).
98. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit dismissed the case on October 1, 1979.
United States v. Progressive, Inc., No. 79-1428 (7th Cir. Oct. 1, 1979).
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amendment rights that are fundamental to our political and social
systems.
J. M. N.
